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ACCOMMODATION OR ENDORSEMENT?
STARK V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT: CAUGHT IN THE TANGLE OF
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHAOS
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
igion .... ."
The simple language of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment belies the complexity of an area of law which
Justice Scalia has described as "embarrassing."2 To say that the
Court has had difficulty identifying and applying the precise
principles of the Establishment Clause would be an understate-
ment.! Recent cases indicate the Court is moving from a strict
separation of church and state to a more accommodationist ap-
proach.4 However, these recent developments have done little to
assist lower courts seeking guidance from the confounding array
of Establishment Clause cases. Lower courts, left with no clear
analytical approach, are relegated to searching for factually
similar precedent upon which to analogize the case before them
regardless of the rationale.5
Recently, in Stark v. Independent School District,6 the
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Bernard James, High Court Takes Confusing Path, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 1994, at C4,
C5 (stating that "Grumet throws establishment clause doctrine further into disar-
ray. [Tihe establishment clause console is now so cluttered with options that the
court must confront the real possibility that it has relinquished its institutional re-
sponsibility to provide a clear user's manual" (referring to the Court's decision in
Board of Education. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)).
3 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1983) (recognizing that "the Estab-
lishment Clause presents especially difficult questions of interpretation and appli-
cation").
4 See infra notes 111-131 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the
Court upheld the constitutionality of providing neutrally available state-aid to sec-
tarian schools).
5 See Joanne Kuhns, Comment, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grume. The Supreme Court Shall Make No Law Defining An Establish-
ment of Religion, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1599, 1661 (1995).
r 123 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, No. 97-1381 (U.S. Feb. 23,
1998).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit faced an
Establishment Clause challenge. In Stark, Minnesota citizens,
who had standing based on their status as taxpayers, filed suit
against the district seeking a declaratory judgment that the
creation and operation of a public school in the town of Vesta,
Minnesota, violated the Establishment Clauses of the United
States7 and the Minnesota constitutions.8 The petitioners also
sought an injunction prohibiting the district from operating the
Vesta school in conformance with the religious beliefs of the
Brethren Church,9 a religious group that originated in Ireland in
the 1820s.' ° The district court agreed with the petitioners' ar-
guments regarding the creation and operation of the school." On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with direc-
tions to dismiss the complaint, in effect holding that a public
school ostensibly created to accommodate an insular religious
group is constitutional. 2
The court of appeals in Stark erred in its application of cur-
rent constitutional principles. The Stark opinion represents an-
other example of the Supreme Court's "doctrinal gridlock" in the
area of Establishment Clause precedent."3 The Stark court's de-
cision reflects the legal quagmire that Establishment Clause ju-
See id. at 1072.
See id. (alleging violation of Article I, §16 of the Minnesota Constitution).
See id.
'0 See id. at 1070 (citing BRYAN RONALD WILSON, "THE BRETHREN" A RECENT
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY (1981)).
" Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 640, 938 F. Supp. 544, 554-55 (D. Minn.
1996), rev'd, 123 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, No. 97-1381 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1998) (declaring that the creation and operation of the Vesta School vio-
lated the Establishment Clause, and granting a permanent injunction enjoining op-
eration of the school in conformance with the Brethren's religious practices). The
judgment of attorney's fees and refund of money to the State was not ordered, how-
ever, because the plaintiffs' brief failed to argue their entitlement to such relief. See
id. The court held "the facts presented by this case provide a clear example of state
sponsorship, or the advancement of a religion which violates the mandates of the
First Amendment." Id. at 550. The court reasoned that that the district had modi-
fied the Vesta school's curriculum "based solely on the request of a religious group."
Id. at 551. The court further found that the effect of opening the Vesta school was to
promote religion: "the opening, and the manner of operation of, the Vesta school
lacks a secular purpose and was done to conform to the religious beliefs of the
Brethren." Id. at 552. The court further concluded that the district had thus created
a "an impermissible identification of its powers and duties with the religious beliefs
of the Brethren." Id. at 553.
12 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1070, 1077.
13 See James, supra note 2 at C5 (discussing the doctrinal disarray of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence after the Court's ruling in Grumet).
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risprudence has become. In attempting to reconcile the facts of
Stark with the current law, the court of appeals failed to appre-
ciate the practical reality of what the creation of the Vesta school
was: a state endorsement of religion.
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical underpin-
nings of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part II reviews
the development of the relevant Supreme Court authority. Part
III examines the facts of Stark. Part IV explores the Stark
court's analysis and exposes its failure to appreciate the message
of endorsement sent by the creation of the Vesta School.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Most constitutional historians would concur that the fram-
ers intended to prohibit the federal government from creating a
state-instituted religion.'4 Beyond this central principle, how-
ever, opinions differ. Although many differing interpretations
exist, most historians and legal scholars generally take one of
two views: separationism or nonpreferentialism. 5 Separationists
hold that the Constitution mandates strict separation of church
and state,16 and prohibits any state aid to religion."1 Conversely,
nonpreferentialists interpret the Establishment Clause and the
framers' intent as prohibiting only the establishment of a na-
tional religion or the promotion of one religious ideology over
others. 8 Under this view, aid may flow to religious interests as
long as the government remains neutral in rendering it.' 9
14 See Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 741 (1986) (discussing the need for an Estab-
lishment Clause).11 See John E. Joiner, A Page of History or a Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 507, 508
(1996).
16 Id.; see also ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
22-26 (1990) (discussing the views of the enlightened separationists).
17 See id.; see also ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 19 (1982).
'8 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 112-13 (2d ed. 1994); see
also Joiner, supra note 15, at 508; Liza Weiman Hanks, Note, Justice Souter: Defin-
ing "Substantive Neutrality" in an Age of Religious Politics, 48 STAN. L. REV. 903,
914-16 (1996).
'9 See Joiner, supra note 15, at 508 (stating that "non preferentialism permits
government support for religion provided no religions or religious sects are excluded
from receipt of the benefit") (citing John Witte, Jr., The Theology and Principles of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489
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In interpreting the litany of Establishment Clause cases, it
is important to consider the clause's historical roots. Although
this history may provide only limited insight into the application
of the clause today, it does give some context to the Court's ear-
lier insistence on separationism. The two principle figures upon
whom the Supreme Court has relied in espousing a seperationist
interpretation in its Establishment Clause decisions are James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. °
Although James Madison was only one of many framers in-
strumental in the adoption and ratification of the Establishment
Clause21 and Thomas Jefferson was not even a participant,22 the
Court's reference to these two men as Establishment Clause pa-
triarchs2 warrants some discussion of their contributions. The
following sections give a cursory review of the documents the
Court has relied on, particularly in its earlier Establishment
Clause decisions. While some legislative history exists regarding
the adoption of the First Amendment, it sheds little light on the
intent of the framers and will be omitted, for purposes of this
Comment.24
(1991)); Hanks, supra note 18, at 915-16.
20 See Joiner, supra note 15, at 508; see also Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 503 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that "Madison and Jefferson played ... leading
roles in the events leading to the adoption of the First Amendment").
21 See Richard E. Levy & Stephen R. McAllister, Defining the Roles of the Na-
tional and State Governments in the American Federal System: A Symposium, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 971, 975 (1997) (referring to Madison's role as one of the framers of the
Constitution); see also Peter Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise
of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POLY REV. 553, 562 (1997) (discussing the framers' dis-
taste for special interests). But see Laura Zwicker, Note, The Politics of Toleration:
The Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773,
793-94 (1991) (stating that although Madison played an important role in the adop-
tion of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, he was not a key participant in the
drafting of the Establishment Clause).
22 See Joiner, supra note 15 at 560 (discussing the Court's unabashed misinter-
pretation of Jefferson's works); see also Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is a Lemon
a Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22
ST. MARY'S L.J. 129, 137 (1990) (explaining that Jefferson was in Paris during the
drafting of the Establishment Clause).
2' See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947) (discussing the key
role that Madison and Jefferson played in the drafting and adoption of the Estab-
lishment Clause). But see Bowen, supra note 22 (pointing to the Court's "excessive
reliance on Madison and Jefferson [in Establishment Clause jurisprudence] to the
exclusion of other framers" as unjustified and a reason for recurring problems in in-
terpreting the Clause).
24 See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CON-
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A. Historical Underpinnings of the Establishment Clause
Madison's 1785 "Memorial and Remonstrance " 25 against re-
ligious assessments was a declaration against a bill authorizing
a tax to be levied on Virginia citizens in support of Christian
teachers. 26 The bill sought to promote "the general diffusion of
Christian knowledge [which] hath a natural tendency to correct
the morals of men."27 In protesting the adoption of the bill,
Madison emphatically advocated for the principle of religious
equality. Foremost among Madison's arguments was the preser-
vation of free exercise of religious conscience.' Madison wrote,
"[iut is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such hom-
age and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him." 9
Madison was concerned with the tyrannical history of religious
establishment,30 warning: "Who does not see that the same
authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?"31
Madison's Remonstrance reflected the ideals held by most
citizens of post-revolutionary America. 2  Madison seemed de-
termined to protect America from experiencing the damaging ef-
fects of ecclesiastical establishments,33 such as the Church of
STITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 26-27 (1995) (noting that the pau-
city of congressional discussions on the religion clauses, as well as their superficial
nature, serve as a clear indication that the framers sought to avoid branding the re-
ligion clauses with a distinct interpretation); see also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra
note 16, at 18 (describing the fragmentary record of Senate debates).
s See JAMES MADISON, To the Honorable the General Assembly of the Common-
wealth of Virginia A Memorial and Remonstrance, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) [hereinafter MADISON].
26 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 1, 72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing) (supplemental appendix). The legislation was proposed by Patrick Henry and
was a successor to an earlier bill that would have imposed a tax to be used for the
support of the Christian religion generally. See Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the
American Idea of Religious Liberty 46 MERCER L. REV. 1123, 1131 (1995).
27 Id. at 72.
28 See MADISON, supra note 25 at 299 (stating "[tihe Religion.. .of every man
must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
ever7 man to exercise it as these may dictate").9 d.
20 See id. at 299-300.
31 Id. at 300.
32 See Catherine E. Lilly, Note, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University
of Virginia: The Supreme Court Revisits the Framers' Intent Behind the Religion
Clauses, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 485, 490 (1996).
33 See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERALIST ES-
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England under which many Americans had suffered,
B. Jefferson's Danbury Letter to the Baptist Association
The metaphor of the "wall" to symbolize church-state rela-
tions is probably the one contribution for which Jefferson is most
noted in the area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Presi-
dent Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in
1802"5 contained this famous and often cited depiction of church-
state relations. In it he denied the Association's request for a
day of prayer and thanksgiving in honor of the new nation,"6
stating:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely be-
tween man and his God, that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of govern-
ment reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should "make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
Church and State.
The letter does not give further explanation or discussion of
what the wall is or what its limits are, 8 and although the meta-
phor has received significant attention in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, its application to the law has proved limited.39
TABLISHMENT 196-98 (1964) (discussing Madison's stance against the establishment
of an exclusive national religion).
34 See id. at 16-17 (discussing the draconian penalties imposed on colonists who
failed to honor their church duties). For example, those who were not members of
the establishment, particularly Catholics, were commonly denied the right to vote
and hold public office, could not serve as witnesses, and may have been subject to
indictment and conviction for refusing to swear allegiance to and receive the sacra-
ments from the Church of England. See id.
35 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association
1903) [hereinafter JEFFERSON].
6 See ANTIEAU, supra note 33, at 183.
37 See JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 281-82.
38 See id.
"9 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(referring to "Jefferson's misleading metaphor"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673 (1984) (calling the wall metaphor "a useful figure of speech ... [but] ... not a
wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state").
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C. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
Perhaps providing better insight into Jefferson's intent is his
proposal, co-authored with Madison, entitled "A Bill for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom," which one historian describes as
"'the most important document in American history, bar
none.'" 0 The bill was introduced in the Virginia Legislature in
1779."' It proved to be "too radical" a proposition for its time,
and was not passed until 1786.42 In the interim, both Madison
and Jefferson were involved in the fight to quell a tax which
would have infringed on religious liberty.43 Indeed, it was this
struggle that gave rise to Madison's Remonstrance denouncing
the tax, the success of which led to the bill's passage on January
19, 1786."
The Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom recog-
nized freedom as the basic underlying principle of the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise Clauses.45 The bill reflected Madison
and Jefferson's attempt to curtail the rising domination of the
Anglican faith within the State of Virginia by creating "an equal
legal footing" among Virginia's religious sects.46 Indeed, the pro-
posed bill's preamble reflected their concerns, stating "[wihereas
Almighty God hath created the mind free[, and manifested his
supreme will that free it shall remain, by making it altogether in-
40 Hoyt Gimlin, Religious Freedoms Bicentennial, EDITORIAL RES. REP., Jan. 9,
1986 (quoting historian Bernard Bailyn of Harvard University).
41 See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Re-
vision of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of
Church-State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 160 (1990).42 See id. at 164, 166.
43 See id. at 164 (discussing the Virginia legislature's bitter battle over the sin-
gle tax assessment).
44 For more detailed historical account see id. at 166; see also ADAMS &
EMMERICH, supra note 16, at 12.
45 See John W. Baker, Belief and Action: Limitations on Free Exercise of Relig-
ion, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 271, 273 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985)
(proposing that three justifications for religious freedom exist: (1) it relates to the
concept of free speech, (2) it reflects the desire of American society to reject conclu-
sory idealisms, and (3) it maintains the ideal of fairness to individuals); EDD DOERR
& ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 12-13
(1993) (noting that by creating a bill of rights, early politicians sought to complete
the Constitution's advancement of democracy and freedom); see also id. at 13
(suggesting that because the majority of citizens and courts of this nation subscribe
to Jefferson's principle of the separation of church and state, the country has
"achieve[d] the world's highest levels of individual religious freedom, religious plu-
ralism, and interfaith peace and harmony").
46 ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 16, at 12.
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susceptible of restraint] ."4 The bill condemned forced assess-
ments for religious propagation and prohibited government sup-
port for religious institutions.48
While the documents and legislative history surrounding the
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom provide some
insight as to circumstances when the wall of separation is
crossed, 49 a debate among scholars still exists. Some scholars
maintain that the Establishment Clause is violated whenever
government support flows to religious interests.0 Others argue
that a violation of the Establishment Clause does not occur un-
less the aid favors sectarian interests.5 The history of Supreme
Court cases reveals a Court seeking to balance the Establish-
ment Clause somewhere between these divergent opinions.52
4 Id. at 110 (emphasis in original).
48 See id. at 110-11.
49 See Marvin K Singleton, Colonial Virginia as First Amendment Matrix:
Henry, Madison, and Assessment Establishment, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 157, 158 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) (noting that the Supreme Court often
looks to Virginia history when interpreting "religion" in a constitutional context).
See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 (1962) (observing that the Virginia act
was one of the earliest pieces of legislation seeking to place all religious groups on
an equal footing); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947) (looking to the
situation faced by colonial Virginia, at the time the state enacted the Virginia Bill of
Religious Liberty, to analyze the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute).
See, e.g., Peter J. Weishaar, Comment, School Vouchers and the Establish-
ment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543, 545 (1994) (discussing the extreme interpreta-
tions of the Establishment Clause); GREGG IVERS, LOWERING THE WALL: RELIGION
AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 1980S 39-40 (1991).
51 See Weishaar, supra note 50, at 545. At one extreme are the "non-preferential
accomodationists," who maintain that state aid can flow to sectarian interests pro-
vided no particular religion is singled out for support. Id. (citations omitted). At the
other end of the spectrum are the "strict separationists," who argue that the wall of
separation is breached whenever government support reaches religion. Id. (citations
omitted).
52 See Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 423, 445-46 (1995) (describing the analysis used by the
Court in Widmar v. Vincent, 545 U.S. 263, 264 (1981) and School District v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 379, 397 (1985)); Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Estab-
lishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 692-93 (1968) (examining the inherent
conflict between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause which im-
pacts Supreme Court decisions); See, e.g., Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,
10-13 (1988) (describing previous Court decisions concerning the constitutionality of
religious groups' receipt of governmental funds).
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II. THE COURT'S IINTERPRETATION
A. The Lemon Seed
In the first modern Establishment Clause case,53 Everson v.
Board of Education,' the Supreme Court acknowledged Jeffer-
son's "wall of separation."55 In Everson, despite holding that the
State of New Jersey was not prohibited from compensating par-
ents of both parochial and public school children for costs of city
bus transportation to school,5 the Court adopted the principle of
separationism.57  The Everson Court concluded "[t]he
Earlier, the Court had extended religious freedom under the First Amend-
ment to state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
330 U.S. 15 (1947).
55 Id. at 18. The Court's opinion concluded by stating- "The First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and im-
pregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." Id. The significance of Ever-
son is said to lie in the fact that:
There, for the first time--over a century and a half after the Clause was
added to the Constitution-the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a compre-
hensive interpretation of the minimal prohibitions that the Court said
were required by the phrase: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion...."
CORD, supra note 17, at 109 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (emphasis in original).
See also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 16, at 23 (explaining that although the
Court utilized the metaphor in its first religious clause decision in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), its use in Everson propelled the phrase to a
heightened constitutional level).
56 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18. The dissent, commenting on the apparent con-
tradiction of the majority, stated "the undertones of the opinion, advocating com-
plete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant
with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters."
Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson further criticized the opinion of
the Court, commenting "[t]he case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fit-
ting precedent is that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will
ne'er consent" -- consented.' " Id.
67 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 113-45 (1994)
(discussing Madison's thoughts on the meaning of the First Amendment and how his
interpretation has been misconstrued); id. at 150-51 (noting that Everson estab-
lished the principle of separation of church and state in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence); Arlen Specter, Defending the Wall: Maintaining Church/State Separa-
tion in America, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 575, 581 (1995) (commenting that "it is
Everson... that [commentators] excoriated for its role in fixing the concept of a wall
of church/state separation in American jurisprudence") (citing DAVID BARTON, THE
MYTH OF SEPARATION 42 (1989); Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme
Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict or Chaos? 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 581, 614 (1995) (stating "generally ... the Court's cases beginning with Ever-
son were animated by a theory of separationism") (emphasis in original).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can.., pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another."" The Court qualified what oth-
erwise seemed a strict separationist view, however, by asserting
that although the Establishment Clause "requires the state to
be... neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary."59
Since Everson, several justices have criticized the "wall"
analogy." Dissenting in Wallace v. Jaffree,"1 Justice Rehnquist
stated "[tihere is simply no historical foundation for the proposi-
tion that the Framers intended to build the 'wall of separation'
that was constitutionalized in Everson."" Rehnquist continued
his criticism, arguing that "[t]he 'wall of separation between
church and State' is a metaphor based on bad history, a meta-
phor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should
be frankly and explicitly abandoned."'
An important contribution of the Everson decision was the
Court's reasoning which later became known as the "child bene-
fit doctrine."" Government funds allocated to a school or organi-
zation with religious affiliations are considered to be aiding that
institution and, accordingly, religion.' However, if funding can
68 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. The Court's conclusion followed an extensive analysis
of the history of the Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom and the First Amendment.
See id. at 8-15.
"9 Id. at 18.
60 See James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon:
The Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 671, 672 n.11 (1990); see also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 16, at 23
(explaining that recent judicial decisions disclose hesitation towards applying the
concept for a number of reasons, including the proposition that the phrase is merely
a "literary comparison" while the words in the Amendment serve as a better ana-
lytical guide).
61 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
6Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6Id. at 107.
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Emerging Legal Issues in Nonpublic Education, 83 EDUC.
L. REP. 1, 3 (1993) (discussing the revival of the "child benefit theory" in the context
of private education: "To make government assistance to religious schools constitu-
tionally palatable, those advocating such assistance have pressed courts to consider
parents and/or students, rather than the schools, as the primary recipients of the
assistance.")
"See id. (noting that such a transfer of finances from the government to a relig-
ious institution would be considered a violation of the Lemon test).
666 [Vol. 72:657
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be construed as being allocated specifically for the parents or
students, and not for the religiously affiliated organization, the
aid is deemed to benefit the child.8" The child benefit doctrine
thus supports the conclusion of constitutionality in situations
where government aid does not flow directly to the religious or-
ganization.67 Utilization of this doctrine in school-aid cases shifts
the focus to the benefit received by students rather than the
subsidiary benefit received by religious organizations with which
the students are associated.
In 1963, the Court initiated a two-step analytical framework
for Establishment Clause cases in School District v. Schempp."
The Court held that to survive an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge the government action must have "a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."69 In Schempp, the Court applied an analysis that first
determines whether the benefit was to the child; if so, the
Court's analysis ends because the First Amendment is deemed
not to be implicated.7 ° If the challenged aid is found to benefit or
affect a religion, then the "purpose and primary effect" test is
triggered.7 Any direct "advancement or inhibition of religion"
will not "withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause."72
In Engel v. Vitale,7" the Court used this test to strike down
prayer in public schools.7
See id.; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993)
(expressing that the Establishment Clause is not violated where "government pro-
grams ... neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without ref-
erence to religion").
6See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (permitting publicly funded sign-language inter-
preter to assist a deaf student attending a Roman Catholic school). But see Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (considering that Everson
does not comply with the First Amendment).
6374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69 Id. at 222 (citations omitted) (supporting the concept of"neutrality" under the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
70 Id.
71 Devora L. Lindeman, Comment, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District:
Private Choices and Public Funding Under the Establishment Clause, 47 RUTGERS
L. REV. 839, 856-57 (1995) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222) (discussing the Es-
tablishment Clause test set forth in Schempp).
71 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 ("The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution.").
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
74 Id. at 430 (finding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit fed-
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In Walz v. Tax Commission,' decided in 1970, the Court
added a third step to the analysis of Schempp, when they held
that there must not be "excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 6 In approving a tax exemption for church property,
the Walz Court went beyond considering the purpose and effect
of the statute, and examined whether its application created ex-
cessive entanglement with religion." The Court reasoned that
allowing the tax exemption would give rise to less entanglement
than forcing religious organizations to pay taxes." The Walz
Court, contradicting the strict separationist view, recognized
that some interaction between church and state will occur, how-
ever, it relied on historical evidence to support the conclusion
that providing a tax exemption is a neutral government act
which does not violate the Establishment Clause. 9
B. The Lemon Test
Two decades after Everson, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,"0 the
Court built on the framework of Schempp and Walz by formally
instituting a test which became central to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence."1 In Lemon, the Supreme Court struck down
eral and state government sponsorship of official prayer).
5 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
76 Id. at 674 (noting this inquiry involves a question of degree).
"Id.
78 Id. at 674-75 (refraining from applying the tax for fear that it would implicate
ongoing and extensive government administrative oversight).
79 Id. at 676-78 (pointing out, for example, that there has been a real estate tax
exemption for religious entities dating back to the earliest days of Congress).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
s, Id. at 612-13. In 1992, Justice Blackmun noted: "Since 1971, the Court has
decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one instance, the decision of Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) has the Court not rested its decision on the basic
principles described in Lemon." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). He observed that "[i]n no case involving religious activi-
ties in public schools has the Court failed to apply vigorously the Lemon factors." Id.
Since 1992, the Court appears to have shied away from the Lemon test because its
framework has only been applied on an ad hoc basis. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(expressing belief that the Court's Establishment Clause decisions lack consistency).
See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997) ("[T]hree primary criteria
we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing
religion: [whether] it ... results in governmental indoctrination; [whether it] de-
fine[s] its recipients by reference to religion; or [whether] it create[s] an excessive
entanglement."); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1993);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeat-
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Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes which granted state aid
directly to parochial schools.82 Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion delineated the Lemon test, explaining: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;' finally, the statute must not foster an 'excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.'!" The Court stated that
this analysis sought to prevent "the three main evils against
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protec-
tion: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity.' "
1. The Secular Purpose Prong:
The fact that the Court has spent little time analyzing the
secular purpose prong suggests that this prong carries the least
edly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and bur-
ied, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again ....");
Stephanie E. Russell, Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause Tests, Look-
ing Past the Lemon, 60 Mo. L. REV. 653, 653 (1995) (noting that "[aifter the decision
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, one three-pronged test controlled all Establishment Clause
issues") (citations omitted).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 (assessing the constitutionality of PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, §§ 5601-09 (West 1971) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (1970)). The Pennsylvania
statute provided reimbursement to private schools for materials, textbooks, and
teacher salaries that were used to teach secular subjects. See id. at 609. The Rhode
Island statute provided salary supplements to the "teachers of secular subjects" in
private schools. Id. at 607. Concluding both statutes were in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court's opinion stating "[tihe Constitution decrees that religion
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of pri-
vate choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines
must be drawn." Id. at 625.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968)). The origin of the first two prongs of the Lemon test originated in School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Schempp Court held that a Pennsyl-
vania statute requiring public school teachers to read from the Bible at the.begin-
ning of each school day violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 205, 223. The
Court sought to determine whether the statute had the purpose or effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion. See id. at 222. The Court applied both of the two
prongs to ensure governmental neutrality towards religion. See id. Despite the out-
come, the Court reflected upon the ties between the government and religion that
has historically existed. See id. at 212-14.
8 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)). In Walz, the Court examined a New York property tax exemption for relig-
ious organizations. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 666-67. Although the statute passed con-
stitutional scrutiny, the Court created what would become the third prong of the
Lemon test, which focused on preventing excessive entanglement in relationships
between government and religion. See id. at 674.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
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weight of the three." The Court appears hesitant to find an un-
constitutional motive under this first prong; it has generally de-
ferred to any claimed legislative purpose.87 In instances where
the Court has found that a state's purported secular purpose in
enacting a statute is a "sham," however, it has demonstrated a
willingness to strike it down as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.88
2. The Primary Effects Prong:
The primary effects prong ensures that governmental aid
programs assume a neutral position towards religion.89 The
Court has based its application of this requirement on a "fact-
intensive and case-specific analysis"" and it has recognized that
"the [Establishment] Clause does absolutely prohibit govern-
ment-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the
"6 See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985), partially overruled on other
grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (noting that "[als has often
been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test"); Mueller v. Al-
len, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (noting that "[u]nder our prior decisions, govern-
mental assistance programs have consistently survived this inquiry even when they
have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon framework"); see also David Futter-
man, Note, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public
Aid to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711, 726 (1993) (stating that "no law
providing public aid to religious schools has been invalidated on the secular purpose
prong of Lemon") (citations omitted).
See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 (cataloging many viable reasons for spending
public money on education, and stating that the Court is hesitant to impute
"unconstitutional motives to the States"). Although Mueller addressed a state stat-
ute, it seems probable that the same deference would be given to a state school
board. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (stating that the purpose
prong may be satisfied by "a statute that is motivated in part by a religious pur-
pose"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (holding that a statute fails the
"secular purpose" requirement only if "the statute or activity [is] motivated wholly
by religious considerations"); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (finding a
legitimate legislative interest in protecting and educating children via aid to private
schools).
8 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75 (stating that this prong reminds the legislature that it
must not act to endorse a particular religion, and that the Court is capable of rec-
ognizing a "sham secular purpose").
See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
788 (1973) (stating that the government must remain neutral and refrain from ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion in seeking to assist the underprivileged); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1969) (noting "the basic purpose ... is to insure that no
relilgon be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited").
Alison Wheeler, Recent Development, Separatist Religious Groups and the
Establishment Clause-Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 227 (1995).
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beliefs of a particular religious faith."9 The Court has not ap-
plied the effects prong coherently,92 causing critics to describe its
utilization as unclear and inconsistent.93  In spite of this, it
seems fairly certain that direct financing or patronizing of relig-
ious activity, as well as symbolic support of religion created by a
close relationship with the government, will generally raise the
specter of a violation.
3. The Entanglement Prong:
Although the Court has shed more heat than light on the
question of when entanglement is excessive,' it is clear that to
survive this prong governmental legislation or programs must
meet two considerations. First, the Court will be concerned with
any long term administrative relationship between state and re-
ligious organizations." Second, the Court will consider the prob-
9' Ball, 473 U.S. at 385 (citations omitted) (finding a violation of the primary
effects prong by a government program that funded the teaching of secular subjects
in religious schools).
92 See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255 (holding that states may provide "books, stan-
dardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial
services" to non-public school children, but are prohibited from supplying
"instructional materials and equipment and field trip services"); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 361, 372 (1975) (holding that states cannot lend instructional materi-
als such as maps, magazines, transparencies, tape recorders and laboratory mate-
rials to parochial schools despite the holding in Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968), that lending books was permissible); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding that states may not reimburse parochial schools
for the costs of parochial teachers administering state-required tests); cf Mueller v.
Allen 463 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1983) (upholding tax deductions to parents of parochial
students); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
481-82 (1980) (holding that states may subsidize parochial schools for costs of ad-
ministering state-prepared exams); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756 (rejecting tuition re-
bates and tax deductions).
See Ralph W. Johnson I, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Can Make Bad Law
Too - The "Direct Coercion" Test is the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard,
2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 123, 161 (1993) (stating that the lack of a clear defi-
nition of primary effect has caused "inconsistent and unpredictable decisions"); Ann
MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decisionmaking
for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 751
(1994) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to define the primary effects prong
in a "meaningful manner").
94 See Peter J. Weishaar, Comment, School Choice Vouchers and the Establish-
ment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543, 568 (1994) (noting that the Supreme Court offers
"little guidance" in evaluating this prong).
95 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. Administrative entanglements occur when the
state would require "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state sur-
veillance" to ensure neutrality. Id. at 619.
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ability that the relationship will cause political divisiveness
among religious groups.6 As with the primary effects prong, the
entanglement aspect of the Lemon test has been roundly criti-
cized for its incoherence and misapplication.97 The Court itself
admits that the application of this test is an "elusive inquiry,"98
and recently has called the import of the entanglement prong
into question by ignoring it completely.99
Although the Lemon test has proven functional in numerous
cases,100 many critics have charged that it is often either misap-
plied or used selectively depending on the particular needs of the
court applying it.1"' Even the Supreme Court's recent cases have
9 See id. at 622. Government's involvement becomes politically divisive if it
risks causing strife and strain among religious sects. See id.
97 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that the entanglement prong is responsible for the inconsistencies of Estab-
lishment Clause decisions); see also David E. Steinberg Alternatives to Entangle-
ment, 80 KY. L.J. 691, 707 (1991) (stating that "[tihe Court should either develop a
consistent, principled, and predictable law of excessive entanglement or abandon
the entanglement doctrine altogether").
9" Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983) (noting that the interpretation of
this'prong has differed from case to case).
See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (omitting
discussion of excessive entanglement in the majority opinion); Witters v. Washing-
ton Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 n.5 (1986) (expressly "declining
to address the 'entanglement prong' at this time"); cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing the Lemon test and noting the many occasions where the Court has de-
clined to use it).
100 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395-97; Witters, 474 U.S. at 485-89;
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 410-14; Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-94 (1973).
'0' See Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious
Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1017, 1059-71 (1995)
(explaining the Lemon test and its misuse, and noting that the "Court has ignored
the Lemon test in number of recent cases and relegated its three prongs to the
status of 'useful guideposts' in others"); see also Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the
Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N.
KY. L. REV. 621, 634 (1995) (finding the "nonapplication, malapplication and mis-
application of Lemon" to be the cause of the Court's confusing and irreconcilable Es-
tablishment Clause decisions); Russell, supra note 81, at 660 n.53 (cataloging Su-
preme Court Justices who have criticized Lemon and its application); Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Founda-
tional Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 858-73
(1995) (describing problems with the Lemon test). Justice Scalia has observed:
When we wish to strike down a practice [Lemon] forbids, we invoke it;
when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Some-
times, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than
helpful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might
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raised some doubt as to the continued viability of the three-part
test for Establishment Clause violations.
C. A Court Without a Standard
Although in recent years the Court had opportunities to
clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it has declined to do
so.' °2 It seems apparent that although Lemon has not been ex-
plicitly overruled, it may suffer death by disuse. For example,
recently in Board of Education v. Grumet,'°3 the Court's opinion
did not rely on Lemon, mentioning it only twice in "see also"
cites. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor appreciated this
and urged the Court to be "freed from the Lemon test's rigid in-
fluence." "°4 In Grumet, the New York State legislature created a
separate school district for a group of Satmar Hasidic Jews. The
statute empowered a locally elected school board to open a
school, hire teachers, and collect taxes."5 By a 6-3 vote the Court
held that the institution of the Kiryas Joel Village School Dis-
trict violated the Establishment Clause.'w The majority empha-
sized two problems with the creation of the district. First, the
boundary lines of the district were drawn using the residences of
the Hasidism as a criteria. 7 Second, the Court found that the
creation of the district particularly favored the Satmars, and
there were no assurances that similarly situated groups would
receive the same treatment.' The Court held that accommoda-
tion here had gone too far, and found that the special treatment
need him.
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
102 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); Board of
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). The Court did not directly apply the Lemon
test or provide a new standard in any of these cases. But see Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (declining to use the Lemon test and suggesting a coercion test,
stating "the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so' ") (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).
103 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
'04 Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the broad Lemon test
be replaced with several narrower tests, that could be applied to different categories
of the Establishment Clause).
105 See id. at 693
1'0 See id. at 688-89.
107 See id. at 701-02.
'8 See id. at 704-05.
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of the Satmars over other religious groups amounted to "a pur-
poseful and forbidden 'fusion of governmental and religious
functions.' ,"9 Justice O'Connor, concurring in part, reasoned
that a more neutrally drafted statute might achieve the desired
ends without violating the Establishment Clause. "'
The Court's most recent pronouncement on the Establish-
ment Clause came in Agostini v. Felton."' In Agostini, the Court
overruled Aguilar v. Felton,12 as well as portions of School Dis-
trict v. Ball,"' and held that the rationale in those cases had
been undermined by the subsequent decisions of Witters v. Wash-
ington Department of Services for Blind. and Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District,"' as well as other cases."6
In Witters, the Court found that state assistance to a blind
student at a religious college did not violate the Establishment
Clause because it did not have the effect of advancing religion."7
The Court noted that although a religious institution ultimately
received the funds, this receipt is "only as a result of the genu-
inely independent and private choices of aid recipients.""8 Since
the program was neutrally available, the Court concluded that it
provided no incentive for students to seek religious education."9
In Zobrest, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did
109 Id. at 702 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982)).
11o See id. at 717 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A district created under a gener-
ally applicable scheme would be acceptable even though it coincides with a village
that was consciously created by its voters as an enclave for their religious group.").
.., 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
112 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985) (holding that a New York City program which
provided public school teachers to parochial schools for remedial education of un-
derprivileged children violated the Establishment Clause).
11 473 U.S. 373, 412-14 (1985) (holding that the Shared Time program, which
provided remedial classes to parochial school students at the public's expense, of-
fended the Constitution). In Agostini, the Court specifically noted that it no longer
relies on the rule pronounced in Ball that "all government aid that directly aids the
educational function of religious schools is invalid."Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011.
114 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
115 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
116 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding that a university program that funds student activities on a religion-
neutral basis does not violate the Establishment Clause where religious organiza-
tions are involved).
117 See Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
" Id. at 487. The Court noted that "the mere circumstance that petitioner has
chosen to use neutrally available state aid to help pay for his religious education
[does not] confer any message of state endorsement of religion." Id. at 488-89
(citation omitted).
"9 See id. at 488.
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not bar individuals from receiving benefits from general welfare
programs merely because they attended parochial schools.2 In a
5-4 opinion, the Court reversed a federal district court order
which denied a deaf student's request to have the school district
provide him with a sign-language interpreter. 1 The interpreter
was assigned to the student under the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act ("IDEA")," which requires disabled students
have access to a "free appropriate public education." 3 The stu-
dent had used the interpreter while attending grades six through
eight in public school. 4 When his parents sent him to a Catholic
high school, however, the school district denied his request for
the interpreter's continued assistance.2' In reversing the district
court's decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that "any attenu-
ated financial benefit that parochial schools do ultimately receive
from the IDEA is attributable to 'the private choices of individual
parents.' ,12' Applying the child benefit doctrine, 7 the Court
found the aid was directed to the disabled child and not the relig-
ious high school. 8 Thus, the Court concluded that any benefit
that the school received was merely incidental. 9
In Agostini, the Supreme Court relied on Witters, Zobrest
120 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
121 See id. at 2, 4-6.
122 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1994) (originally enacted as the Education of the
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)).
123 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
124 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
125 See id. The request was referred to the county attorney who concluded that a
government provided interpreter used in a Roman Catholic high school would offend
the Constitution. The Arizona State Attorney General agreed. See id.
126 Id. at 12 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983)); see also Witters,
474 U.S. at 487, 489 (noting that when a religious school received aid through an
individual's private choice there was no Establishment Clause violation).
127 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12 (stating that "[d]isabled children... are the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the IDEA"); see also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the child benefit doctrine).
120 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
'29 See id. (stating "to the extent sectarian schools benefit at all from the IDEA,
they are only incidental beneficiaries"); see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (finding no
indication that state assistance to a blind student at a religious college would fund
religious instruction when the funds were available to all similarly impaired people
and flowed to the sectarian institution only by private choice of the recipient); Muel-
ler, 463 U.S. at 388 (declining to engage in an "empirical inquiry" to quantify the
benefits to religious institutions in upholding a Minnesota statute which permitted
tax deductions for parents of school children to utilize for specified educational ex-
penses, including sectarian school tuition).
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and other post-Aguilar decisions3 ° to hold that remedial instruc-
tion provided on sectarian school premises by public employees
under Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education
Act was constitutional. The Act provided federal funding for
remedial instruction for disadvantaged pupils in both private
and public schools without reference to their religion.3 2 Moreo-
ver, portions of the Act were designed to safeguard the secular
and supplemental nature of the funded services.' 3
After Agostini, it can no longer be presumed that direct aid
to sectarian schools is unconstitutional. The presence of public
school teachers in parochial school classrooms does not neces-
sarily create the impermissible impression of a "symbolic union"
of church and state.133 The Court determined that the Title I re-
medial instruction in Agostini was "indistinguishable" from the
IDEA provision supplying sign language interpreters to sectar-
"'0 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010-11 (1997) (stating that the cri-
teria used to decide whether aid to sectarian institutions violates the Establishment
Clause has changed since Aguilar). While the Agostini Court relied largely on
Zobrest and Witters to overrule Aguilar, five justices had called for its reversal in
Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718, 731, 750 (1994). See Agostini, 117
S. Ct. at 2007. See also Joseph W. Bellacosa, A Shared Spirit of Justice, 37 CATH.
LAW. 269, 280 n.32 (1997) ("The Agostini Court determined that Aguilar was not
consistent with subsequent establishment clause decisions and declared that Agui-
lar was no longer good law.").
"' See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016 (holding that "a federally funded program
providing... instruction to disadvantaged children... is not invalid under the Es-
tablishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian
schools by government employees").
12 See id. at 2004 (asserting "Title I fimds must be made available to all eligible
children, regardless of whether they attend public schools").
'33 See id. at 2004-05 (listing Title I safeguards, which included instructions to
teachers stressing the program's secular purpose, removal of all religious symbols
from Title I classrooms, and unannounced inspections by field supervisors).
134 See William Bentley Ball, Economic Freedom of Parental Choice in Educa-
tion: The Pennsylvania Constitution, 101 DICK. L. REV. 261, 263 (1997) (asserting
that opponents of direct aid to sectarian schools are now resorting to state constitu-
tional challenges because the Constitution of the United States no longer bars such
aid). Prior to Agostini, assistance programs were more likely to be upheld if the aid
was given to students and their parents, rather than directly to the school. Ensuring
that the aid would be used for secular purposes was considered easier if the parents
and the child, rather than the school, were given control of the money or materials
being provided. See id. at 269 (contrasting cases involving school subsidies with
those involving direct aid to individuals, and noting that the latter decisions have
held that individual aid does not violate the Establishment Clause).
'3 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010 (stating "we have abandoned the presump-
tion..., that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevi-
tably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or consti-
tutes a symbolic union between government and religion").
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ian schools approved in Zobrest"' and found no reason to believe
that the safeguards prohibiting state-sponsored inculcation of
religion would cause an excessive entanglement. 3 7  Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, did not rely on Lemon's
three-prong test; instead O'Connor focused on the factors used to
determine both "effect" and excessive "entanglement" and rea-
soned that the two requirements were coterminous."' In analyz-
ing the constitutionality of Stark, it is important to note the fun-
damental difference between the supplemental education
allowed in Agostini and the basic elementary school education at
issue in Stark.
D. Alternative Inquiries
In addition to the Lemon test, the Court has offered alter-
native inquiries upon which it has analyzed Establishment
Clause cases. These inquiries include the endorsement test, the
coercion test and the traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
1. The Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor advanced the endorsement test as an al-
ternative to Lemon in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly."'
At issue in Lynch was a nativity scene erected by the city of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island. 40 Justice O'Connor declared that the
nativity scene, while a symbol of a traditional Christian holiday,
was part of a secular display and thus was not an endorsement
of religion.' O'Connor sought to alter the Lemon test, suggest-
ing that Establishment Clause scrutiny should focus on whether
the message that the government action conveys is one of prefer-
13 See id. at 2012.
137 See id. at 2015-16 (concluding that periodic monitoring by supervisors and
cooperation between public employees and sectarian schools were not sufficient to
constitute excessive entanglement).
18 See id. at 2015 (recognizing that entanglement is significant "as an aspect of
the inquiry into a statute's effect"). The factors that Justice O'Connor considered
relevant to both the entanglement and effect inquiries included the nature of the
institution, the nature of the aid and the nature of the relationship between the in-
stitution and the State which resulted from the aid. See id.
139 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
' Id. at 671. The Christmas display was built in cooperation with the Paw-
tucket downtown merchants' association. See id.
141 See id. at 692. ("The display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends
that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an endorsement of religion.").
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ence for or approval of religion.12 Under the endorsement test,
the Court would first determine "whether [the] government's ac-
tual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion."' Second,
the Court would use a modified effect prong of Lemon to inquire
"whether, irrespective of [the] government's actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorse-
ment."'4 Subsequently, Justice O'Connor questioned the useful-
ness of Lemon's entanglement prong in Aguilar.'45
Under the endorsement test, government actions may in-
hibit or advance religion so long as no message of endorsement
or disapproval is attached.'46 The test shifts the focus to the
message the government action is communicating about religion
rather than the effect of this government action upon religion."'
O'Connor's endorsement test was adopted in Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU;4 ' however, the Court has yet to indi-
cate that the endorsement test will be applied in school-aid
cases.
14 See id. at 688 ("Endorsement sends a message to non-adherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity. Disapproval sends the opposite message."). Justice O'Connor continued ques-
tioning the Lemon test, stating "[iut has never been entirely clear... how the three
parts of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 688-89.
"3 Id. at 690. In utilizing the purpose prong of the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor
would look to see if a challenged program had a secular purpose that (1) was more
important than any religious purpose, and (2) was not pretextual. See id. at 690-91.
144 Id. at 690.
145 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 422 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I
question the utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment Clause standard
in most cases.").
... See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (granting tax exemptions
for religious institutions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding
Maryland's "Sunday Blue Laws"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(permitting off-campus religious instruction during school hours). Justice O'Connor
cited these cases to demonstrate examples of statutes which advanced religion with-
out violating the Establishment Clause. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (interpreting the effect prong of the Lemon test so as to not require in-
validation of state action on Establishment Clause grounds "merely because it in
fact causes ... advancement or inhibition of religion").
147 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In upholding the city of
Pawtucket's nativity scene display, O'Connor suggested that the Court's analysis
should have centered on the message the city sought to convey and what message
the "audience" received. See id.
1s 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held
that "the government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the
effect of endorsing religious beliefs." Id.
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2. The Coercion Test
First suggested by Justice Kennedy in Allegheny County,"'
the coercion test, which focuses on the extent to which the gov-
ernment coerces citizens into supporting or rejecting religion,
provides another means of evaluating potentially unconstitu-
tional unions of church and state. ' Subsequently, in Lee v.
Weisman,"' Kennedy resorted to this test to strike down an invo-
cation and convocation at a middle school graduation."' Justice
Kennedy appears to be the main proponent of this test and its
application may be limited.5 '
3. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
In Larson v. Valente,54 the Court developed yet another al-
ternative inquiry that may be relevant in Stark. The Larson
Court did not apply the Lemon test, declaring that it was only
"intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all re-
ligions."155 When governmental action discriminates by granting
a denominational preference, it must have a secular purpose and
141 In Allegheny County, the ACLU brought an Establishment Clause challenge,
claiming two holiday displays in Pittsburgh created a state endorsement of religion.
See id. at 573. A divided Court permitted one of the displays on the grounds that it
did not constitute an endorsement of religion; the other display, a crbche, was held
to violate the Establishment Clause. See id at 613, 616.
"'o See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (asserting that coercion is of
greater concern when it is done in a public educational setting).
' ' 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
1.2 See id. at 592-93 (reasoning that students had no choice but to attend the
graduation ceremonies and were coerced into participating in its religious aspects).
The Court rejected the school district's argument that because the students had the
option of not attending, the district's action was not coercive. The Court considered
such reasoning "formalistic in the extreme." Id. The Court found that the situation
more accurately reflected an absence of choice based on the significance of the cere-
mony. See id.
10 See Stick, supra note 52, at 455 (noting that Justice O'Connor criticized the
coercion test as a simple restatement of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing Kennedy's
"psycho-coercion test" and advocating ceremonial deism). It seems, however, that
Justice Scalia, and the other dissenters in Lee, would likely adopt the coercion test if
there was a legitimate penalty for non-compliance with the religious activity chal-lenged.
"q 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
6' See id. at 252. While not relying on the Lemon test, the Court concluded it
would have reached the same result, stating "[alithough application of the Lemon
tests is not necessary..., those tests do reflect the same concerns that warranted
the application of strict scrutiny." Id.
679
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:657
meet strict scrutiny as applied in Equal Protection jurispru-
dence. 116  The statute must be narrowly tailored to meet a com-
pelling governmental interest.5 7 The application of this test is
usually limited to government action which "facially differenti-
ates among religions."'6 8 Thus, if a group is granted a denomi-
national preference, strict scrutiny will apply.'59  "Whether all
religions together constitute a suspect class for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause[, however,] is a far more complex ques-
tion that the courts have not previously addressed."161 It can be
argued that strict scrutiny should be triggered in cases such as
Stark, where one religious group is granted a benefit that cannot
be guaranteed to other such religious groups. 61 In earlier cases,
however, the Supreme Court has declined to pursue this type of
inquiry.
6 2
D. Modification of Curriculum
Another Establishment Clause issue relevant to Stark is
that of tailoring a school's curriculum. In Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, '6 the Court held that a state may not eliminate particular
ideas from a curriculum simply because they conflict with relig-
ious tenets.'6 At issue in Epperson was a state statute prohibit-
15' See id. at 246. The Larsen Court struck down a Minnesota law which im-
posed public reporting requirements on religious organizations only when contribu-
tions came from members. See id. at 255. The Court concluded that the law was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. See id-
'57See id. at 247.
1'8 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989); see also Larson, 456
U.S. at 245-46 (reiterating the Constitution's prohibition of denominational prefer-
ences and requirement that all religions be treated similarly).
"1' See, e.g., Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (state laws granting denominational prefer-
ence require strict scrutiny). This is particularly true where more moderate means
are available to achieve the same objective.
'60 Christian Science Reading Room v. San Francisco, 784 F.2d 1010, 1012-13
(9th Cir. 1986).
'c' See Grumet v. Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 102 (N.Y. 1993) (Kaye, C.J.,
concurring) (finding that the statute failed the strict scrutiny test developed in Lar-
son, since there were more moderate measures available to provide educational
services to the Satmar children), affd 512 U.S. 687 (1994). As stated by Chief Judge
Kaye, "legislation that singles out a particular religious group for special benefits or
burdens should be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test." Id.
'6 See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (failing to address the
strict scrutiny argument proffered by Chief Judge Kaye).
'63 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
'c See id. at 107.
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ing the teaching of the Darwinian theory of human evolution.1 6
The Court held that the statute violated the Establishment
Clause because it failed the secular purpose requirement.166 The
elimination of ideas from a course of study, driven only by relig-
ious beliefs, was found to violate the principle of neutrality. 67
Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, sought to maintain the
state's right to control its curriculum, reasoning that a state
should be able to eliminate any particular subject matter from
being taught in its schools without raising a First Amendment
challenge. 6 ' This reasoning seems sound, considering that if a
state is not obligated to teach certain material, there should be
no reason not to allow its elimination.'69
Deference to state educational authority and by extension to
local school boards has two limitations.17' First, if the elimina-
tion of only one aspect of a particular subject matter is done for
strictly religious reasons, then the state will be found to have
furthered that religious viewpoint because opposing views have
been eliminated.' For example, in Epperson, the Court focused
on the fact that the motivation for the exclusion of evolution from
the curriculum was improper.' Second, in the absence of any
secular reason for adjusting the curriculum, there is no reason to
defer to the state's action, and the principle of neutrality will be
'c See id. at 98. The "anti-evolution" statute was adopted by Arkansas in 1928
to prohibit teaching the theory that man evolved from lower species of life. See id. at
98-99. The Court, finding the law unconstitutional, stated that the Arkansas law
was "a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor of the twenties."
Id. at 98.
16' See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-09. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1272 (5th ed. 1995).
'7 See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
1 8 See id. at 112-14 (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting that Arkansas' decision
to remove evolution from its curricula may have been motivated by a desire to avoid
controversy for pedagogical, rather than religious, reasons).
1g9 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, at 1272; see also Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1978) ("States and local school boards are generally afforded
considerable discretion in operating public schools."); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1968) ("[The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the... authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with con-
stitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control... the schools."); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that the First Amendment "does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom," implying schools
should be given great leeway in selecting curricula).
170 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, at 1272.
171 See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106.
172 See id. at 103, 107-09.
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found to have been violated. 173
More recently, in Edwards v. Aguillard,174 the Court was
faced with an attempt by a state legislature to aid a specific re-
ligious viewpoint by granting equal time to the discussion of
creation in the classroom.' The Court again found this to be an
invalid attempt at modification of the curriculum, determining
that the purpose was clearly promotion of a religious viewpoint,
and was therefore improper.'76 The Court did note that legisla-
tures and local school boards have authority to design curricula
based on non-religious grounds.7 7  Notably, Justice Brennan
made a distinction between grade school and college level pro-
grams. Concerned about the influence of a tailored curriculum
on the minds of the young, he reasoned that colleges and uni-
versities should be granted greater authority to offer religion
178courses.
Against this jurisprudential backdrop, the Eighth Circuit re-
cently vaulted over the limits of the Establishment Clause by
embracing an excessively accomodationist approach in deciding
to reverse a district court injunction against state aid to a relig-
ious school operating under the guise of a public school.
III. THE STARK FACTS
Independent School District No. 640 (the "district") is a rural
school district in southwestern Minnesota. 179 The district had
operated elementary schools in the towns of Wabasso and Vesta
until 1984, when it closed and sold the Vesta school building.8 '
Following the closure, the Vesta children either traveled four-
teen miles to attend the Wabasso school or were home-
schooled.181
173 See id. at 109; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, at 1272 (noting
that such an open attempt to aid religious views was presented in Epperson, leading
to a breach of the principle of neutrality at the heart of the religion clauses).
'7 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
176 See id. at 578
171 See id. at 590-91.
'7 See id. at 583-84.
171 See id. at 584 n.5.
'79 See Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997), peti-
tion for cert. filed, No. 97-1381 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1998). The district covers approxi-
mately 225 square miles of farm land. See id.
See id. at 1078 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the school was closed
for economic reasons).8' See id. at 1070; see also id. at 1078 (noting "[v]arious accommodations were
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The Vesta elementary school building was sold to a member
of the Brethren, a religious group whose practices include
avoiding the use of technology, such as television, radio, video,
film and computers. 82 In 1992, the owner of the building, along
with several resident Brethren families, wrote to the district su-
perintendent proposing a reopening of the Vesta school as a
multi-age classroom.' They also requested that the charter of
the school contain a clause prohibiting the use of technology an-
tithetical to the Brethren's beliefs." 4 Ultimately, a three-year
lease was signed by the district, the building owner and the
Brethren."5 In return for the operation of the school as a
"public" school, with the district providing the teachers and in-
structional materials, the Brethren agreed to pay all the other
expenses necessarily involved in maintaining the school. 1"6 The
lease provided that the school would be open to any resident in
the district, and explicitly stated that the parents of Brethren
children would have the same right to comment on and provide
input regarding classroom materials as other parents had, sub-
ject to the district's final "sole discretion."187 The lease also
stated that the district would limit the use of objectionable tech-
nology, to the extent permissible by law, in the classrooms of the
school.'88 It was proposed that students who did not adhere to
the Brethren's views, which redacted counseling, health educa-
tion, physical education and music instruction from the curricu-
lum, could receive supplemental instruction by traveling to the
made at Wabasso to respect the religious beliefs of the Brethren, such as providing
separate tables for their children at lunch and excusing them from activities that
involved technological devices").
182 See id. at 1070 (citing BRYAN RONALD WILSON, "THE BRETHREN" A RECENT
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY (1981)).
See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1070.
'" See id.
'8 See id. at 1071 n.2. The fact that the Stark court found the lease evidence in-
consequential because the person who signed the lease for the Brethren allegedly
lacked the authority to do so, reveals its result-oriented approach. See id.; cf. id. at
1078-79 nn.8-9 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (finding that the inclusion of the Brethren
on the lease was an indication of the religiously motivated establishment of the
Vesta school).
188 The expenses included utilities and property taxes, maintaining the grounds,
and providing for custodial services, as well as property and liability insurance re-
lated to the building. See id. at 1071.
18 Id.
188 See id.
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neighboring Wabasso school.'89 Also, hot lunches would not be
provided by the Vesta school, since Brethren children's religious
beliefs required them to have lunch at home with their fami-
lies.190
During the approval process, members of the school board
viewed the opening of the Vesta school as beneficial primarily for
financial reasons, as well as pragmatic and pedagogical ones. 9'
Dr. Bates, the superintendent, stated that the principal advan-
tages of reopening the Vesta school included reduced busing, re-
duced class size and alleviation of space shortages in Wabasso. 9 2
He also noted that the operating costs of the Vesta school would
be minimal. 9' It was also believed that opening the Vesta school
would provide additional educational benefits to those students
who otherwise may have been home-schooled.'94
After public meetings, the school board approved the open-
ing of the Vesta school.'9' When the Vesta school finally opened
only Brethren children attended, in spite of the fact that the
school was intended to serve the entire community. 9 6 The super-
intendent and the board members attested that the religious
background of the parents or students was not discussed and
was not relevant to their decision to open the school.'97 The rec-
ord, however, is absent of any evidence that the school district
attempted to recruit non-Brethren students or mandated atten-
dance at Vesta for those in the locale, despite it being ostensibly
a public school. It appears that non-Brethren students simply
chose to continue attendance at Wabasso.
This result should not be surprising considering that the
school was publicly perceived as being affiliated with the Breth-
ren.'98 For example, a local newspaper story recounted that the
agreement to open the school, which appeared to be on tenuous
legal footing, came about to allow the Brethren to avoid sending
1' See id.
'9o See id. Hot lunches were available at Wabasso, and the district stated that it
would cater such lunches to students at Vesta if the need arose. See id. at 1071 n.3.
191 See id. at 1070.
19 See id.
193 See id.
See id.195 See id.
'9 See id. at 1071.
197 See id. at 1070-71.
198 See id. at 1073 (referring to the district court conclusion that the Vesta
school was perceived in the community as a Brethren school).
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their children to the Wabasso school, where technology and
teaching methods objectionable to the Brethren were used. 99
Indeed, as Judge Murphy noted in his dissent, there were
significant differences between the curricula offered at Vesta and
Wabasso.'o The Vesta curriculum did not include the same ac-
cess to educational technology, physical education, health edu-
cation, music or art.2"' Consequently, to receive health, music or
physical education instruction, a child attending the Vesta school
needed to make a special request and travel thirty miles, round
trip to Wabasso and back, during the school day."2
The Brethren were also involved in other ways in the re-
opening of the school. For example, members of the Brethren
participated in the interviewing process to select the teacher.0"
"It [was] undisputed that it was unprecedented to have non-
'" See id. at 1078 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy recounted the news
story:
The Wabasso Board of Education has reached an agreement with the Vesta
Brethren to proceed with plans for a K-6 elementary school at Vesta this
fall ....
If it is legally possible to establish this school, it would be operated without
the assistance of modern technology such as computers, and video and
audio equipment. The reasoning behind this is that the Brethren's religious
beliefs prohibit them from using such items, and this has created a conflict
in trying to send their children to the public school in Wabasso, which uses
such teaching tools and methods.
To eliminate the need to remove these children from the public school envi-
ronment and teach them at home, the Brethren made the proposal for a
second school in Vesta last year.
Id. (quoting Vicd L. Gerdes, Agreement is Reached on Proposed School in Vesta,
REDWOOD GAZETTE, June 17, 1993).
200 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1079.
20' Although district officials claimed that computer technology was available at
Vesta, and the official curriculum adopted for the school called for at least one half-
hour of computer training each week, such instruction had never been offered. See
id. Technology, such as television, video players and movies, were never used at
Vesta, although they were consistently available at Wabasso. See id. The health
education offered at Vesta differed from that at Wabasso; for example, the drug
awareness program employed at Wabasso was absent from Vesta's curriculum. See
id. While there was an official requirement of thirty minutes of physical education
with "specialists" each day, at the Vesta school the instruction was provided by a
Brethren parent without state qualifications or formal training in physical educa-
tion, while at Wabasso physical education was taught by a trained physical educa-
tion teacher. See id. Finally, while music instruction was also required by the official
curriculum, there was no showing that it was ever actually offered by the Vesta
school. See id.202 See id.
203 See id.
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district employees present at such interviews."2  Additionally,
the evidence showed that the perception of the Vesta school as a
"Brethren" school even affected some applicants for the position.
For example, one applicant thought it was relevant to note on
her resume that she had prior experience in religiously affiliated
schools. 2°5  Moreover, the nineteen children who enrolled in the
Vesta school were those on a preliminary list provided by the
Brethren to the superintendent.2 6 The segregation of the Vesta
school population was not the result of geographic distribution.
There were non-Brethren children residing in Vesta whose par-
ents were forced to make the "choice" to send them to Wabasso
fourteen miles away in order to receive a full education.0 7
Writing for the Eighth Circuit, Judge Wollman concluded
that the school district acted neutrally towards the citizens of
the district.28 The court began its analysis with the Lemon
test, 9 and found a legitimate secular purpose of educating the
district's children, citing the pedagogical and economic reasons
stated above. 10 The court noted that the decision to open the
Vesta school was based on "secular reasons of space efficiency,
savings in transportation costs, and the addition of a multi-age
classroom and corresponding reduction in class sizes., 21' The
court also noted that the prevention of a loss of state funding to
the district by forestalling home-schooling of the Brethren chil-
dren constitutes a legitimate secular purpose.212 Relying pri-
marily on the recent Supreme Court decision in Agostini,1 3 the
Stark court concluded that the other two requirements of the
Lemon test, no advancement or inhibition of religion and no ex-
204 Id.
205 See Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist., 938 F. Supp. 544, 553 (D. Minn. 1996),
vacated and remanded, 123 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, No. 97-
1381 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1998).20 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1079 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
207 See Stark, 938 F. Supp. at 552.
208 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1077.
209 See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
210 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1073; see also supra notes 191-94 and accompanying
text (discussing the reasons behind the Board's approval of the school).
211 Stark, 123 F.3d at 1073.
22 See id. (reasoning that since home-schooling reduced the amount of state aid
flowing to the district, keeping those children in classrooms maintained funding
"that benefits all students within the district"). Testimony estimated the state aid
lost would amount to $3200 for each student withdrawn from school. See id. at 1070.
213 See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and ra-
tionale behind the Supreme Court's holding in Agostini).
[Vol. 72:657
19981 STARK V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
cessive entanglement, were satisfied.214 The majority found the
Vesta school to be a legitimate accommodation of the Brethren's
beliefs and rejected the contention that the school's curriculum
was impermissibly changed to comport with the Brethren's relig-
ious scruples because it found that Vesta's curriculum was the
same as that at the Wabasso school.215 The court also rejected
the contention that the Vesta school was no different from the
school in Grumet,26 and found instead that the establishment of
the Vesta school complied with the principle of neutrality central
to the Grumet Court's decision.217 Finally, although the court
gave a nod to the endorsement test, it did not really apply it to
the facts of the case.218
Judge Murphy, in a well-reasoned dissent, argued that the
"establishment" of the "special school" in Vesta went beyond the
limits of the First Amendment.21 9 He contended that the Vesta
school violated the principle of neutrality and characterized it as
an "unlawful fostering of religion."=0
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Exceeding the Limits of Accomodation
Although recent decisions have defended religious organiza-
tions, and the Supreme Court's trend could certainly be charac-
terized as moving from a separationist approach to accommoda-
tionist,21 one theme persists: accommodation is not a principle
214 Stark, 123 F.3d at 1074-75.
215 See id. at 1074.
216 See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Gru-
met).
217 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1075-76. Arguably, Grumet is distinguishable but for a
different reason. An issue in Grumet not present in Stark is that of delegation of a
state's power based on religious criteria. In Grumet the religious group was actually
granted control of a school district as a result of political gerrymandering. See supra
notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
218 See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1077 (finding no violation of the endorsement test by
simply reiterating that the district had acted neutrally and had "not made anyone's
adherence to religion relevant to their standing"). But see supra notes 139-44 and
accompanying text (describing "endorsement test" set forth by Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly). Under the endorsement test the Court views
governmental action from the perspective of a "reasonable observer" to ensure pro-
hibition of governmental sponsorship of a particular religion.
219 Stark, 123 F.3d at 1082.
220 Id. at 1079.
22' See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neu-
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without limits.222 The principle of a neutral state stands as an
insurmountable barrier to excessive accommodation that would
lead to the advancement or establishment of religion in violation
of the First Amendment. The facts in Stark present a case that
exceeds the limits of accommodation.
Unlike the litany of cases dealing with aid to private schools,
this case involves a public school catering to a religious group
under the guise of economic incentives. As evidenced by the in-
terpretations of those in the neighborhood, the creation of the
Vesta school created the unshakable perception of this "public"
school as a "Brethren School."' This fact, which goes directly to
the inquiry developed in the "endorsement test," was ignored by
the majority.2m Although the endorsement test has not tradi-
tionally been applied in non-communicative cases such as school-
aid controversies,2" Stark presents an opportunity for the appli-
cation of this test. Admittedly, any court trying to distill the ar-
ray of Supreme Court decisions into a controlling test to apply
faces a daunting challenge. But the Stark court could have
avoided this minefield simply by categorizing the facts. The
creation of the Vesta School clearly set forth state endorsement
of a particular religion, and any outward attempt to comply with
the limits of the law cannot hide the fact that Vesta was, in fact,
a Brethren school.
The scenario presented by Stark is a clear violation of the
Establishment Clause in a way not previously presented in the
context of aid to parochial schools, where at least a defense of
private choice can be raised. In Stark, it is not the choice of the
students or their parents that directs the flow of state aid,
trality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Re-
ligious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 167 (1992).
See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705.
23 See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.224 See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the
endorsement test as being satisfied when "no reasonable observer is likely to
draw.., an inference that the state itself is endorsing a religious practice or be-
lief"); supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
766 n.2 (1995) (finding Justice O'Connor's endorsement test inapplicable to display
of religious symbols with the context of that case); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472
U.S. 703 (1985) (refraining from applying the endorsement test in considering a
state statute that gave private employees their Sabbath day off). But see id. at 711
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "[uin my view, the ... law has an imper-
missible effect because it conveys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath obser-
vance").
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rather, it is a direct catering to a religious institution by a state
institution. An assertion of parental rights cannot aid the par-
ents in Stark. The Brethren did not petition the school district
for funding for their private school, rather they demanded the
tailoring of the Vesta school, in terms of curriculum and struc-
ture, as a quid pro quo for the economic incentives they offered to
the school district. The Vesta school was structured differently
from other area public schools, as evidenced by the changes in
curriculum. This restructuring to accommodate the Brethren's
religious viewpoint sent a powerful message to the citizens of the
surrounding area as well as the students of the school, and vio-
lated both the neutrality and endorsement restraints on govern-
ment action."6
The notion of equality proposed in Grumet cannot be ig-
nored. Although the curriculum in Grumet did not reflect the
religious beliefs of the Satmars, the Supreme Court pointed to
the fact that the Satmars were granted control over a school
board. " In striking down the New York legislation granting
such power to the Satmars, the Court highlighted the fact that
there was no guarantee that other groups throughout the state
would receive the same treatment. 28
Similarly, in Stark, the district singled out the Brethren for
preferential treatment, with no guarantee that other groups
throughout Minnesota would be given the same treatment. The
fact that the district attempted to ensure that the Vesta school
conformed to state educational laws cannot conceal the fact that
the creation of the school gave the Brethren the imprimatur of
state support. All children who reside in the United States are
entitled to receive public education. 9 The fact remains that the
22' The idea that the structure of an educational system sends an educational
message is not new. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 113-14
(1987) (making a parallel argument pertaining to the inculcation of gender prefer-
ence); LETTY COTTIN POGREBIN, GROWING UP FREE: RAISING YOUR CHILD IN THE
80'S 491 (1980) (same); James C. Farrell, Note, Johnny Can't Read or Write, But
Just Watch Him Work: Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory High School
Community Service Programs, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 795 (1997) (arguing that the
structure of mandatory community service programs inculcates values in violation
of First Amendment speech rights of students).
227 See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 698.
228 See id. at 726.
229 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 469 (1988)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating education is "the very foundation of good citizen-
ship," without which a child cannot reasonably be expected to succeed) (quoting
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Brethren children were distinguished from others, in that they
received this education entitlement in a particularized form be-
cause of their religious affiliation.
B. Unacceptable Curriculum Modifications
The Stark court's conclusion that the curriculum changes
only reflected religiously neutral exemptions failed to take into
account the context in which these exemptions occurred, as well
as the extent of the changes. The exemptions in Stark amounted
to a full-scale adjustment of curriculum, unlike in Grumet, where
the curriculum did not differ from the special education curricu-
lum offered in other parts of the state.20 In Stark the curriculum
was so fundamentally changed that requiring non-Brethren chil-
dren to attend Vesta to receive such instruction was impracti-
cal. 1 The district's selective elimination of particular aspects of
the curriculum not only coincided with a religious purpose, it
was predominated by such a purpose. 2 This symbiotic relation-
ship between the Brethren and the government was also re-
flected in the granting of changes in the curriculum as a quid pro
quo for the Brethren's offering of economic assistance which the
district gladly seized. The court's claim that religion was not ad-
vanced by the creation of the Vesta school was not supported by
the facts of the case. Similar to the open attempt to aid religious
viewpoints struck down in Epperson,"3 the school district in
Stark "openly breached the principle of neutrality, which is the
Brown v. Board Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (holding that even children who are not citizens are entitled to public
schooling). Plyler expanded the Court's holding in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which merely recognized that absolute deprivation of
education would be impermissible.
20 The Stark court's reliance on Agostini is also misguided. Agostini dealt with
supplemental education only. Stark, on the other hand, is concerned with basic ele-
mentary school education. To stretch the holding of Agostini to justify the Vesta
school misses this key distinction.
2 1 A non-Brethren child would need to travel thirty miles round-trip each day to
receive the equivalent to the instruction available at the Wabasso school. Avoiding
additional travel to Wabasso would presumably be a major, if not the only, factor in
a non-Brethren's decision to transfer to the Vesta school. Removing this incentive
thus negates the allure of the Vesta school over the Wabasso school to non-Brethren
families.
232 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 608 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that legislation is not invalid unless "its purpose is to advance a par-
ticular religious belief).
See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
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core of the religion clauses."' Moreover, there is no evidence of
a secular purpose for the changes, a requirement unequivocally
required by Epperson. The court's claim that the exemptions
would not cause excessive entanglement misses the mark. Not
only are Brethren religious tenets clearly intertwined with the
changes to the curriculum, thereby losing any claims to neutral-
ity, but the state, by agreeing to these changes, is endorsing a
religious curriculum as perceived by objective observers.
C. The Role of the Public Education System
The role of public schools in American society is an impor-
tant consideration in the context of Stark. As the current debate
over school vouchers suggests, there may be many good reasons
why religious groups, such as the Brethren, want to establish
their own school programs. It seems reasonable, and perhaps
even desirable, to allow citizens to run private sectarian schools,
including schools that teach curricula which espouse a particular
religious viewpoint. But religious endorsement, as demonstrated
by an openly parochial school, is entirely different from the mes-
sage of religious endorsement sent by an ostensibly public insti-
tution, such as the Vesta school. It may be true that in our plu-
ralistic society, citizens will not be able to agree on the definition
of what constitutes a "common school." 5  Citizens across the
United States vigorously disagree about the goals of public edu-
cation. The inability to find a single favored educational solu-
tion, however, should not prohibit the courts from identifying
substantive limits on what is permissible for public schools.
Whether we are concerned about curriculum, structure, or politi-
cal organization, the Constitution does not allow public schools
to endorse a particular religious group, such as the Brethren."
The public school system is a conduit of the government and
their messages are explicitly connected. A public school district,
driven by religious viewpoint, implicitly endorses that viewpoint.
Therefore, when a public school suggests that religious affiliation
24 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166 at § 17.5(d) (referring to Epperson).
25 See generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values:
Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 169 (1996).
236 See Judith Lynn Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks of Religious Enclaves in a
Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in Kiryas Joel, 72 IND. L.J. 383
(1997) (concluding that when it comes to public education, enclave groups must be
willing to receive their education on the public's terms).
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is relevant to achieve political ends, that message is altogether
different than when the same message is sent by a sectarian
school structure unaffiliated with state control and funding. If
private citizens or groups want to educate their children pursu-
ant to a particular religious viewpoint, they are allowed to do so
by sending their children to a parochial school. 7 Public schools
are funded directly by public monies, which accordingly signifies
public approval. A distinction must be maintained between the
use of public money to publicly endorse religion, in violation of
the Establishment Clause, and the constitutionally protected
right of private groups to endorse religion under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. Private choices which further a group's religious
beliefs should not be funded by the public. The courts should
demand that education provided by the state remain religiously
neutral.
Moreover, a public school should be representative of the
larger community in which it is located. The social associations
that result from the interaction of children of diverse back-
grounds conveys a message of necessary political association
with others. The Vesta school, by design, was strictly for mem-
bers of a specific group, giving its students an improper impres-
sion of what it takes to interact and contribute as a member of a
pluralistic society. The limited reality of who attends the Vesta
school obscures the very real presence of others in the locality
and sends a message that religious affiliation is relevant for po-
litical purposes.
CONCLUSION
The Stark court's characterization of the Vesta school as
permissible accommodation represents an impermissible depar-
ture from Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Vesta school
is for all practical purposes, a "Brethren School" supported and
run by the state. Such a result leaps beyond accommodation to
impermissible endorsement. The Establishment Clause stands
as a constant reminder that the state must avoid placing its im-
primatur on a particular religion or on religion in general over
non-religion. In attempting to strike the proper balance between
27 It is a well recognized right of parents under the Free Exercise Clause to
send their children to religious schools if they can afford it. See Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down Oregon statute requiring attendance at
public schools).
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religious accommodation in education and impermissible en-
dorsement, the Court has been cautious. Although recent deci-
sions demonstrate that the Supreme Court has moved towards a
more accommodationist approach, the type of accommodation
granted in Stark is unprecedented and signifies a constitution-
ally impermissible state endorsement of a particular religion,
John W. Huleatt
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